





FOR UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION
Introduction
In terms of population, territory, govemment, foreign relations, economic devel- 
opment, and democratization, and under international law, Taiwan has every right 
to become a member of the United Nations.
Since 1993, Taipei has indicated its desire and taken the appropriate ac- 
tions to join the United Nations, but Beijing has consistently blocked the campaign. 
After President George W. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, Taipei was able 
to improve relations with the United States and gained more support for joining 
such international organizations as the World Health Organization (WHO). Fur- 
thermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) initiated several reforms and 
broadened the traditional concept of diplomacy.
The Chen govemment has expanded “people’s diplomacy”, which uses in- 
dividuals other than professional diplomats to implement foreign policy. People’s 
diplomacy provides a three-dimensional approach consisting of democracy-based 
diplomacy, civilian-based diplomacy, and public opinion-based diplomacy1.
Taipei emphasizes participation of non-govemmental organizations 
(NGOs) and expanding the number of groups involved in foreign affairs to promote 
the people’s diplomacy. Compared to the former govemment, the current govem- 
ment has amplified human rights diplomacy. The Chen govemment decided to 
establish a National Human Rights Commission, not only to further improve hu­
man rights in Taiwan, but also to participate in international human rights organi­
zations and human rights treaties.
* Institute o f  European and American Studies, Academia Sinica.
1 H u n g -m a o  T ie n , Foreign Policy report to the Legislative Yuan, cited in: http://www.mofa.gov. 
tw/newmofa/emofa/policymofa900115.htm.
Taiw an’s UN Cam paign
The Republic of China (Taiwan) was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, 
and it took more than 20 years for Taipei to initiate efforts to re-join the UN. In 
1993, Jason Hu, former director-general of the Government Information Office, 
argued that there are ten reasons that Taiwan and the UN need each other. For ex- 
ample, the UN cannot afford to ignore Taiwan’s democratic and economic 
achievements, while Taiwan wants to regain its rightful intemational status, so it 
can contribute to the intemational community. Taipei adamantly asserts that the 
PRC does not and cannot represent Taiwan in the UN2.
Taipei’s campaign for UN membership includes economic benefits, inter- 
national status, national security, and domestic political support. As Dennis Hickey 
stated, “no other foreign policy issue has captured the imagination of the island’s 
voters like the popular movement to gain re-admission to the United Nations”3. In
1997 Taiwan public opinion poll proved that almost 92 percent of people supported 
membership in the United Nations, and 80 percent of respondents believed that the 
PRC was the major obstacle to Taiwan’s campaign4.
However, Beijing regards Taipei’s UN campaign as “a maneuver to create 
two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” and “an attempt to split state sovereignty, 
which is devoid of any legał or practical basis”. Beijing also wams the intemational 
community to “adhere to the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and related UN resolutions, abide by norms goveming intemational rela­
tions”, and “never, in any form, support Taiwan’s joining the UN or other interna- 
tional organizations whose membership is confined to sovereign states”5.
Even after several years of frustration in Taiwan’s UN campaign, 34 percent of 
people think that the govemment should be more active in its UN bid (see Table 1).
Table 1. Taiwanese People’s Expectations of their Govemment Policy in its UN Cam­
paign
May 2002 November 2001 June 2001 July 2000
Accelerate 33.7% 41.7% 37.0% 46.3%
Decelerate 23.8% 16.6% 19.9% 21.8%
Suspend 21.7% 22.0% 23.2% 17.6%
Source: The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, ROC http://www.mofa.gov.tw.
2 21 Million Chinese in Taiwan Have to Be represented in UN, “The United Nations Association o f the 
Republic o f China Newsletter” 1993, vol. 48, No. 9 (September 30), pp. 4-7.
3 D. V a n  V r a n k e n  H ic k e y , Corning in front the Cold: Taiwan’s Return to International Organiza­
tions, “Issues & Studies” 1994, vol. 30, No. 10 (October), pp. 98-102; V. W e i- c h e n g  W a n g , How Can Taiwan 
Enter the United Nations? History, Issues, and Approaches, “Issues & Studies” 1994, vol. 30, No. 10 (October), 
pp. 121-124.
4 B. J. D ic k s o n ,  The Republic o f  China on Taiwan’s Pragmatic Diplomacy, [in:] Taiwan’s National Se­
curity: Dilemmas and Opportunities, eds. A. C. T an , S. C h a n  and C. J i l l s o n ,  Ashgate 2001, p. 99.
5 The Taiwan Question and Reunification o f  China, “Beijing Review” 1993, vol. 36, No. 36 (September 
6-12), pp. VII-VII1; The One-Chine Principle and the Taiwan Issue, “Beijing Review” 2000, vol. 43, No. 10 
(March 16), p. 23.
In order to focus intemational attention on Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN, Taipei 
has repeatedly offered financial aid for UN-sponsored projects. In 1991, Taipei 
offered financial assistance to countries affected by the Persian Gulf War, includ­
ing Turkey and Egypt, but the aid was refused as a result of pressure from Beijing.
As Lien Chan, former Prime Minister and Vice President of the ROC, once 
noted, even Taiwan’s humanitarian assistance to refugees has been reąuired to “go 
through various subterfuges, instead of the front door of intemational organiza- 
tions”6. In 1995, Taipei offered US $1 billion in financial assistance to developing 
countries, if it were admitted to the UN7. In 1999, Taipei again offered $300 mil- 
lion in aid for Kosovo’s recovery program8. Taipei maintains a foreign assistance 
program for allies, which consistently advocate Taiwan’s membership in the UN.
6 L. C h a n , The Republic o fC hina  on Taiwan Belongs to the United Nations, “Orbis” 1993, vol. 37, No. 4 
(Fali), p. 635.
7 Lienhebao, “United Daily News” 1995, June 27; D. V a n  V r a n k e n  H ic k e y , Taiw an’s Security in the 
Changing International System, Boulder 1997, p. 122.
8 L. T e n g -h u i ,  Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap, “Foreign Affairs” 1999, Vol. 78, 
No. 6 (November/December), p. 10.
National security may be the most important element in Taiwan’s UN 
campaign, considering the UN Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing neces- 
sary means to expel Iraąi forces from Kuwait. It might be difficult for the UN to 
send troops to intervene in a conflict involving Taiwan, but it would be possible for 
the UN to discuss the issue, or pass some non-binding resolutions deploring Chi­
nese aggression actions against Taiwan. Therefore, membership in the UN and an 
Asia-Pacific regional security organization to guarantee Taiwan’s security was an 
early goal of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency.
Under pressure from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and some 
liberał KMT legislators, the former government set up the UN Participation Deci- 
sion-making Group under the Executive Yuan (February 1993) and a cross-party 
UN Participation Committee (June 1993). The govemment deliberately avoided 
using the term such as a “re-entry” into the UN, which might imply substituting the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) or “joining” the UN as a new member and 
which might be interpreted as a move toward Taiwan independence. The govern- 
ment cautiously choose the term “participation” and reserved broader flexibility on 
any UN arrangements. The government also decided to use the name “ROC [Re­
public of China] on Taiwan” for its participation in the UN and set a priority of 
joining the UN specialized agencies rather than the UN itself.
From the very beginning, Taipei has not challenged the PRC’s UN mem­
bership9. In the mid-1990s, the govemment emphasized that Taiwan’s participation 
in the UN followed the practice of parallel representation of such divided nations 
as Korea, which obtained separate representation in the UN in 1991. In addition to 
applying the principle of universality, Taipei argued that both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait are eąual political entities and should participate in intemational organiza­
tions on the basis of parity.
The govemment also explicitly stated that its UN participation would not hinder, 
but actually might help, peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China10. After the 
missile crisis of 1995-1996, Taipei no longer indicated that its UN campaign might 
facilitate reunification. In the December 1996, the cross-party National Develop- 
ment Conference reached a consensus stating that UN participation should be re- 
garded as Taiwan’s long-term goal. This indicated that, although Taipei’s UN 
campaign had been relegated from an immediate to a long-term project, it was cer- 
tainly not terminated.
In 1992, one year before Taipei formally initiated its UN campaign, the 
foreign ministers of Belize, Honduras and Costa Rica; and the Presidents of Pan­
ama, Nicaragua and Latvia brought up the principle of universality and Taiwan’s 
exclusion at the UN General Assembly meeting11. From 1993 to 1996, Taipei 
asked its allies to reąuest the United Nations to set up an ad hoc committee to study 
how Taiwan was being deprived of its rights to participate in the United Nations.
9 Ibidem, p. 10; L i en , Tlie Republic o f  Cliina Belongs in the United Nations, Ibidem, p. 636.
10 The Republic o f  China Yearbook 1995, Taipei 1995, p. 173.
11 United Nations Should Re-admit the Republic o f  China, “The United Nations Association o f the Re­
public o f China Newsletter” 1992, vol. 47, No. 10 (October 31), p. 5.
UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 stated:
“Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, “Considering the 
restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China is essential both 
for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the 
United Nations must serve under the Charter, “Recognizing that the representatives 
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful repre- 
sentatives of China to the United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China 
is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, “Decides to restore 
all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives 
of its Govemment as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United 
Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the 
place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organiza­
tions related to it”.
In 1997 and 1998, Taipei reąuested a review and then the revocation of 
Resolution 275812. This measure was regarded as a provocation in challenging the 
PRC’s representation in the UN and later was dropped. Taipei also discontinued 
the parallel representation model, provided by East and West Germany and North 
and South Korea, to avoid a “one-China” trap and eventual unification.
From 1999 to 2001, countries recognizing the ROC (Taiwan) consistently 
called upon the United Nations “to establish a working group of the General As­
sembly with the mandate of examining thoroughly the exceptional international 
situation pertaining to the Republic of China on Taiwan with a view to ensuring 
that its twenty-three million people participate in the United Nations and its related 
agencies and thereby contribute to the international community”13. In August 2002, 
these countries simply called upon the UN members “to take appropriate meas- 
ures” in order “to recognize the right of the 23 million people of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan to representation in the United Nations system” 14.
A major difficulty for Taiwan’s participation in the UN arises in the Gen­
eral Committee, which sets agenda for the annual UN General Assembly meeting. 
Due to the limited number of countries (currently 27) that recognize the ROC on 
Taiwan, the PRC has easily been able to błock discussion of Taiwan’s participation 
at General Committee debates, even before the issue can reach the General Assem­
bly. Beijing has enjoyed at least a two to one superiority at the General Committee 
debates (see Table 2). However, Taipei has been able to prolong the issue of its 
participation in the General Assembly floor debates. The presidents, prime minis- 
ters, or foreign ministers of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners continue to voice support 
for Taipei’s membership in the General Assembly.
12 Wliy the UN Resolution No. 2758 in 1971 Should Be Reexamined Today, Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, 
ROC 1995 (July), pp. 4-5.
13 „Need to Examine the Exceptional International Situation Pertaining to the Republic o f China on Tai­
wan, to Ensure that the Fundamental Right o f Its Twenty-three Million People Participate in the Work and Activi- 
ties of the United Nations is Fully Respected” , United Nations General Assembly, A/56/193, August 8, 2001, cited 
in: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/emofa/org/un/90/A56193.htm.
14 „Question o f the representation o f the Republic o f China (Taiwan) in the United Nations” , United Na­
tions General Assembly, A/57/191, August 8, 2002, cited in: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/org/un/91/ 
A57191 EN.pdf.












Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC.
President Chen Shui-bian did not mention Taiwan’s goal of joining the UN in his 
inaugural address, but did emphasize Taiwan’s participation in non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). The government continues to push Taiwan’s UN campaign, 
but realizes the difficulties and challenges that Taiwan faces. President Chen once 
pointed out that Taiwan is more ąualified for membership in the UN than the ma­
jority of the organization’s 160-plus members15.
In contrast to the previous govemment position that Taiwan’s participation 
might promote “the eventual unification of China”, the govemment now states that 
Taiwan’ s participation would help to build lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait. The 
UN and the intemational community could “cali for a peaceful resolution of differ­
ences between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China”, and 
“pay close attention to the situation” in the Taiwan Strait16.
However, President Chen did not change Taipei’s tactic by applying for 
new membership under Article 4 of the UN Charter, as advised by Lung-chu Chen, 
a prominent UN expert and presidential advisor. Even with the threat of Beijing’s 
apparent veto over Taiwan’s admission, Chen argued that “Taiwan should simulta- 
neously apply for membership in the United Nations and in other relevant intema­
tional govemmental organizations”, because:
“By applying for new UN membership, Taiwan will clearly demonstrate its 
basie national character as a sovereign, independent state and assert emphatically 
the fundamental dignity and human rights of people of Taiwan. It would help to
15 C. S h u i - b ia n ,  An Opening remark on Taiwan’s Participation in tlie United Nations, June 2001, cited 
in: http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/nrez/showsneak.php4: C. L u n g -c h u ,  Taiwan and the UN Need Eacli 
Other, ‘Taiwan News” 2000, September 24, p. 2.
16 „Need to Examine the Exceptional International Situation Pertaining to the Republic o f  China on Tai­
wan, to Ensure that the Fundamental Right of Its Twenty-three Million People Participate in the Work and Activi- 
ties o f the United Nations is Fully Respected”, United Nations General Assembly, A/56/193, August 8, 2001, cited 
in: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/emofa/org/un/90/AS6193.htm. Cf. L. C h a n , Let the Cry fo r  Justice Spread 
Far and Wide, [in:] Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan, Republic o f  China, ed. J. C. H u, Taipei 1994, pp. 279-280.
mobilize the efforts and resources of all Taiwanese, both at home and abroad, to- 
ward developing Taiwan’s international and security position and playing greater 
roles in international area”17.
Admission of a new member into the UN will be “effected by a decision of 
the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council”. The 
PRC will certainly veto Taiwan’s membership in the UN, but Taiwan might have 
the altemative of observer status, as suggested by international law or international 
politics experts such as Louis B. Sohn and John Bolton18. They believe this ap- 
proach is less provocative to the PRC and not contradictory to Taiwan’s goal of 
joining the UN. With observer status, Taiwan could participate in UN economic, 
social, cultural, and educational activities, etc.
According to the UN Legał Committee, a country that is already a member 
of a UN specialized agency or a member of the UN International Court of Justice 
and is widely recognized by the international community can apply for observer 
status with the Secretary General. If that country’s status is disputable, the Secre- 
tary General will refer the case to the General Assembly.
Divided nations, such as North and South Korea and East and West Ger­
many, were observers before becoming fuli members. The Holy See and Switzer- 
land (before September 2002), are non-member states that have permanent ob- 
server missions at UN headquarters. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
which receives a standing invitation to participate as an observer in the sessions 
and the work of the General Assembly, maintains a permanent observer mission at 
UN headquarters19.
Taipei sincerely hopes that the US could assist Taiwan’s UN bid. Former 
President Lee Teng-hui believed that Taiwan’s participation in international or­
ganizations “would be to American advantage”2 . However, Taiwan’s UN cam­
paign suffered a serious blow when President Clinton made his “three nos” state- 
ment in which he said that the US would not support Taiwan’s membership in the 
UN or any international organizations that require statehood.
In 1999 and 2000, the US, France, and the United Kingdom did not support 
Taiwan’s UN membership in the General Committee meeting of the UN. While the 
United Kingdom praised Taiwan’s democratization and peaceful change of gov- 
emment, London was not willing to support Taiwan, because a majority of states 
opposed Taiwan’s UN membership21. The current govemment has tried to persuade 
permanent members of the UN Security Council to avoid speaking publicly against 
Taiwan’s membership.
France, China, and many other countries argued that UN generał Assembly 
Resolution 2758 settled the issue of Taiwan’s participation in the UN. However,
17 L u n g -c h u  C h e n , Prospects fo r  Taiwan’s Membership in the United Nations, [in:] Taiwan's Ex- 
panding Role in the International Arena, ed. M. H. Y an g , New York 1997, pp. 7-8.
18 L. B. S o h n , Taiwan’s Option o f  Becoming a Permanent Observer, [in:] The International Status o f  Taiwan 
in the New World Order: Legał and Political Consideration, ed. J.-M. H e n c k a e r ts ,  London 1996, pp. 165-166.
19 “Permanent Missions to the United Nations” 2002, No. 287 (January), pp. 279-282.
20 L. T e n g -h u i ,  The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit o f  Identity, Tokyo 1999, p. 134.
21 Press release, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, ROC 2001, No. 136, September 15.
the resolution only expelled “forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek 
from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the 
organizations related to it”.
However, the resolution “failed to address the issue of legitimate repre- 
sentation for the people of Taiwan in the United Nations”, Taipei notes that the 
resolution “did not decide that Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic of China, 
and did not confer on the People’s republic of China the right to represent the Re­
public of China on Taiwan or the Taiwanese people in the United Nations and all 
related organizations”22.
Although the US executive branch has failed to support Taiwan’s member­
ship in the UN, the US Congress has adopted an opposite position. Since 1993, the 
Congress has passed resolutions supporting Taiwan’s UN bid almost every year. 
For example, the House and the Senate adopted House Concurrent Resolution 390 
in October 2000, which states: “Taiwan and its 23 million people deserve appropri- 
ate meaningful participation in the United Nations and other intemational organi­
zations such as the World Health Organization”.
Congress also urged the US govemment to “fulfill the commitment it made in 
the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review to more actively support Taiwan’s participation in 
appropriate intemational organizations”23. Even with the lukewarm attitude from the 
US govemment, Taipei hopes that “the United States will help to make it possible for 
Taiwan to join... the Intemational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other intema­
tional organization that do not reąuire United Nations membership as a prereąuisite for 
entry”24.
The European Parliament has also adopted similar to those by the US Con­
gress. In 1996, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting Taiwan 
and reąuested the UN to create a task force to study the feasibility of Taiwan’s 
participation in UN-affiliated organizations. In addition to initiatives taken by the 
US and the European Parliament, countries neighboring Taiwan have not passed 
similar measures.
Taiwan has established its short-range, intermediate, and long-range goals 
for its UN campaign. Through education and public relation efforts, Taiwan can 
justify its UN efforts by reducing domestic opposition and winning more intema­
tional support. Taiwan trains more experts in intemational affairs and multilateral 
diplomacy. Reducing domestic differences on such issues as name and method of 
UN participation should be completed before a unified public diplomacy effort can 
be initiated. While participating in the UN is important to the national interest, it has 
not overshadowed other more important national objectives, such as maintaining strong 
and amicable relationships with Japan, the US, and the European Union.
Taiwan’s UN effort has successfully mobilized those countries that main­
tain fuli diplomatic relations with Taiwan and has strengthened bilateral relation-
22 „Explanatory Memorandum of Taiwan’s Participation in the United Nations” , cited in: http://www.mo- 
fa.gov. tw/newmofa/emofa/org/un/90/ A56193.htm.
23 “Congressional Record” 2000, October 3, pp. H8726-8728.
24 L ee , The Road to Democracy..., p. 134.
ships. Taipei’s newly drafted International Cooperation and Development Law 
facilitates development assistance to help other developing countries reduce pov- 
erty25. In addition to humanitarian assistance, Taiwan also provides aid to those 
countries, which support Taipei’s UN bid. Discontinuing Taipei’s UN campaign 
for the sake of improving cross-strait relations amounts to wishful thinking. Finding 
ways to channel NGO’s access is a new direction for Taipei to develop Taiwan’s links 
with the UN.
Taiwan’s Participation in Other International Organizations
Partly because of Taiwan’s difficulties in joining intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), and partly because of its diversifying civil society, Taiwan’s participation 
in international NGOs is constantly expanding. Compared with the former gov- 
ernment, the current govemment emphasizes the importance of participating in 
NGOs and is increasing the number of groups involved in people’s diplomacy. 
Before the NGO Affairs Committee was established at MOFA in October 2000, 
Taiwan’s membership in NGOs was 917 in 1997, and 943 in 1998 and 1999. NGO 
participation increased to 983 in 2000 and to 1059 by the end of 200126. In terms of 
categories of NGOs, Taiwan is most active in medicine and hygiene, and this might 
explain why the health and medical community has so encouraged the govemment 
to join WHO.
NGO participation has been the main thrust of the people’s diplomacy. 
MOFA offers seminars and courses for non-career NGO staff to train more people 
to become involved in foreign affairs and has established a volunteer non-career 
Foreign Service mechanism. The NGO Affairs Committee encourages Taiwan 
NGOs to engage in more international activities and to increase interactions with 
NGOs affiliated with the UN and its specialized agencies27.
Currently, Taiwan maintains membership in 17 IGOs and observer status 
in several IGOs, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter- 
American Tropical Tuna Commission, the Central American Parliament, and the 
system of Integration in Central America. Among these, Taiwan is still protesting 
the change of its official name to “Taipei, China” in the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), and regrets that its president and prime minister could not be allowed to 
participate in the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting.
President Chen Shui-bian indicated his strong desire to attend the APEC 
summit in Shanghai in October 2001, as a good opportunity to resume Taiwan- 
Mainland dialogue. Instead of designating Koo Chen-fu, who had participated in
25 H u n g -m a o  T ie n , Human Rights: The Futurę o f  Taiwan’s Diplomacy, cited in: http://www.mofa. 
gov.tw/emofa/20010102.html.
26 ROC Foreign Affairs Almanac 1997, p. 869; ROC Foreign Affairs Almanac 1998, p. 642; ROC Foreign 
Affairs Almanac 1999, p. 752; ROC Foreign Affairs Almanac 2000, pp. 689-692; E. C h i en , A Foreign Policy Re­
port, March 6, 2002, cited in: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/policv/mofa9110306.htm.
27 M a y s in g  Y a n g  and B .T e d a r d s ,  The Role and Importance o f  NGOs in Taiwan Diplomacy, cited in: 
http://dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/napers/2000-09/rP0009001e.htm.
place of Lee Teng-hui in 1995, 1996, and 1997, as his special envoy to attend the 
APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, he asked former vice president Lee Yuan-tsu 
to attend the meeting. This designated representative was rejected by Beijing, 
which declined to issue Lee a letter of invitation. Taipei later declined to designate 
a replacement and for the first time boycotted the informal leaders’ meeting in 
Shanghai.
Twelve years after filling its application, Taiwan became the 144th mem- 
ber of the WTO in January 2002. The WTO offer Beijing and Taipei the opportu- 
nity to end the current political stalemate. President Chen and President Bush have 
urged cooperation under the framework of the WTO, but Beijing is wary of using 
this forum to conduct economic dialogue with Taiwan28. However, Taiwan, as the 
14th largest trading economy, could use the WTO as a legitimate channel to in- 
crease contacts with other WTO members, even though a great majority of them do 
not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taipei also intends to nego- 
tiate free-trade agreements with Japan, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
the Philippines, and the countries of Central America, to avoid further economic 
absorption of Taiwan by the PRC29.
Since becoming a WTO member, Taipei has increased its efforts to join the 
WHO, which states in its constitution that health is a fundamental right of all peo- 
ples. Taipei made its first application in 1997. Beginning in 2002, Taiwan applied 
for WHO membership as “a public health entity” rather than a sovereign state to 
avoid possible violation of the WHO constitution30.usual, the US Congress pro- 
vided key support for Taiwan’s membership in the WHO, even though the PRC 
generated strong opposition.
One of latest US congressional actions was HR 2739, which was later 
signed into law as Public Law 107 -  158 by President Bush on April 4, 2002. The 
Bush administration has modified former president Clinton’s lukewarm position by 
publicly supporting Taiwan’s bid for observer status in the World Health Assem- 
bly31. In addition, the European Parliament endorsed Taiwan’s participation in the 
WHA as an observer on March 14, 200232. Belatedly, on May 14, 2002, Japan’s 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasudo Fukuda declared his support for Taiwan’s WHO 
observer status and the improvement of Taiwan’s standard of health care, because 
Taiwan is geographically close to Japan33.
For the first time, the government has decided to adopt the status of “public 
health entity” to break the deadlock for WHO entry. To justify this compromise,
28 E. C h ie n , B eijing's Participation in the WTO and its Implications fo r  Washington-Beijing-Taipei Tri- 
lateral Relations, cited in: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/MaiorSpeeches/chien910401 .htm.
29 B. M. D e c k e r , Defending Taiwan, „Asian Joum al“ 2002, May 22, p. 11.
30 Expanding WHO Participation to Taiwan: The New Concept o f  Public Health Entity, Ministry o f For­
eign Affairs, ROC 2002, April, p. 2.
31 President Bush Signs WHO Bill into Law, April 4, 2002, cited in: http://www.fapa.org/who/WHO 
2002/B ushsign0405.html.
32 Expanding WHO Participation to Taiwan: The New Concept o f  Public Health Entity..., p. 11.
33 M. C h u , US Expresses Support fo r  Observer Bid, “Taipei Times” 2002, May 15, p. 1; Fukuda: Taiwan 
Should Gain WHO Entry, “Yomiuri Shimbun” 2002, May 15; see also: Press Release, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 
ROC 2002, No. 130, May 14.
MOFA cites examples of other organizations that have accepted Taiwan for mem­
bership. For example, Taiwan is a customs territory in the WTO, an economic en­
tity in APEC, a sports organization in the International Olympic Committee, and 
a fishing entity in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and the Commis- 
sion for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna34. The ąuestion remains 
whether it is a necessary compromise to emerge from international isolation or an 
acceptable degradation of Taiwan’s international legał status.
Taiwan’s membership in the WTO is accepted and welcome by the inter­
national community because of Taiwan’s economic power. For many countries, 
Taiwan’s inclusion in a lower-profile functional organization, such as the WHO, is 
not indispensable. While power politics is important and different charters may 
contain different membership reąuirements, it is still hardly justifiable to exclude 
Taiwan from the WHO or other UN specialized agencies if Taiwan is eligible for 
the WTO.
The motive for Taiwan’s observer status in the WHO is simplified, because 
the WHO is the only UN specialized agency that is ruled by a simple majority. 
Gaining membership in the WHO might advance Taiwan’s membership in the UN.
Taiwan is not only diplomatically isolated in worldwide international or­
ganizations, but also in Asia-Pacific regional organizations. For many years, Tai­
wan has complained about the unfairness of exclusion from the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF). Taiwan’s absence has kept the Taiwan issue from being considered 
in this forum, which ironically is the major multilateral forum designed for Asia- 
Pacific security.
Despite Taiwan’s investments in Southeast Asia, its employment of over
300,000 workers from the area, its economic strength, and its geographical loca- 
tion, Taiwan has not yet beeń allowed to join ASEAN as a member or observer. It 
is also absent from the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM), which is a mechanism for 
organizing civil society dialogue between the two regions, even though the Euro­
pean Parliament passed a resolution encouraging EU members to invite Taiwan to 
participate in ASEM. The EU is also considering establishing a representative O f­
fice in Taiwan by the end of 2002; however, Taipei hopes that the EU can also 
invite Taiwan to the “altemate ASEM” meetings.
While China exerts its influence by sponsoring or initiating track one and 
track two forums, Taiwan finds its international status further challenged. Taiwan’s 
economic influence in Southeast Asia is being eroded by the PRC, as Beijing 
emerges from receiver to donor of international assistance. Beijing has gained 
much influence in Southeast Asia by initiating a China-ASEAN free trade area 
arrangement by 2010 and upholding the spirit of Asian consciousness through the 
Baoao Asia Forum on Hainan Island. Although Taiwan has offered Taipei as the 
headąuarters for such regional organizations as training and sharing information on 
smali and medium enterprises, it is still difficult to offset the emerging China- 
centered regional order.
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Taipei’s participation in APEC and the WTO was achieved despite exten- 
sive conflict between Taipei and Beijing, with the US as the major actuator. Some 
argue that the easiest way for Taipei to join intemational organizations is through 
Beijing. The PRC has adamantly opposed Taiwan’s UN membership, but was 
forced to compromise with those organizations in which Taipei’s participation is 
important to regional or global economics. Taipei’s participation in intemational 
organizations that extend beyond economics has become a great challenge for Tai­
wan, whose leaders wish to prioritize UN membership but hesitate to denigrate 
Taiwan’s intemational legał status in order to win Beijing’s approval of such a flexible 
arrangement as “one country, two seats” in the UN.
Conclusion
By becoming a UN member, Taiwan would not only eam due respect and an equal 
right of participation, but also would demonstrate that its dispute with the PRC is 
not merely a matter of Chinese domestic affairs. The issue of Taiwan’ s participa­
tion in the UN should be treated separately and distinctly from that of the futurę 
status of the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC. By allowing Taiwan to 
have more intemational latitude, Beijing might find that amity rather than enmity 
manifests from a realistic policy.
President Bush’s expanded arms sales to Taiwan and candid remarks on 
using whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself have become a new deterrence 
against military misadventures by Beijing. The PRC is concerned that US policy 
will send a wrong signal to Taiwan independence elements, and Hu Jintao’s trip to 
the US, in part, indicated Beijing’s displeasure over recent developments.
Taiwan is worried that China increasing deployment of missiles opposite 
the island, might complicate the will of US intervention, even in an unprovoked 
attack. President Chen does not equate US support with support for Taiwan inde­
pendence, but he does want to remind the intemational community that Taiwan is 
not a part of the PRC. Even in the Shanghai Communiąue between the US and the 
PRC of February 28, 1972, the US side did not specifically state that it recognizes 
that Taiwan is a part of China.
Taiwan’ s campaign for participation in the UN has continued sińce Chen 
Shui-bian took office in May 2000. Attention has nevertheless been shifted to par­
ticipation in the WHO and other functional organizations, and Taiwan has become 
more flexible in its approach to memberships in certain IGOs, but this does not 
mean that it has cleared all the obstacles presented by Beijing.
President Chen Shui-bian differs from his predecessors because the DPP is 
of more Taiwan-oriented and more reflective of a “Taiwanese” identity. This ex- 
plains why President Chen emphasizes people’s diplomacy and liberally uses 
“Taiwan” as the national designation for Taipei’s participation in intemational 
organizations.
